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Abstract
Various authors ﬁnd that in OECD countries the cross-country
correlation between the total fertility rate and the female labor force
participation rate turned from a negative value before the 1980s to a
positive value thereafter. Based on pooled cross-sectional data, K¨ ogel
(2002) shows that (a) unmeasured country-speciﬁc factors and (b)
country-heterogeneity in the magnitude of the negative time-series
association accounts for the reversal in the sign of the cross-country
correlation coeﬃcient. Our paper aims to identify those variables that
may explain country heterogeneity in the negative association between
fertility and female labor force participation. The selection of variables
is based on existing macro demographic theories. We apply aggre-
gate descriptive representations of the time series and cross-country
evolution of fertility, female employment and a set of labor market,
educational and demographic variables and indicators of social policy.
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11 Introduction
Various authors (Ahn and Mira 2002; Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Esping-
Andersen 1999; Rindfuss et al. 2000) ﬁnd that in OECD countries the cross-
country correlation between the total fertility rate (TFR) and the female
labor market participation rate (FLP) turned from a negative value before
the 1980s to a positive value thereafter. The countries that now have the
lowest levels of fertility are those with relatively low levels of female labor
force participation and the countries with higher fertility levels tend to have
relatively high female labor force participation rates. Following the graphical
presentation in the literature (e.g., Rindfuss et al. 2000), Figure 1 illustrates
this change for 21 OECD countries.1
The change in the sign of the cross-country correlation between TFR and
FLP has often been mistakenly associated with a change in the time series
association between TFR and FLP (Benjamin 2001, Brewster and Rinfuss
2000, Esping-Andersen 1999, Rindfuss et al. 2002). Recent studies by Engel-
hardt et al. (2001) and K¨ ogel (2002) show that neither the causality nor the
time series association between TFR and FLP has changed over time. By
applying error-correction models to six industrialized countries Engelhardt et
al. (2001) ﬁnd Granger causality in both directions, which is consistent with
simultaneous movements of both variables brought about by common exoge-
nous factors. K¨ ogel (2002) not only shows that the time series association
between TFR and FLP has not changed, but he also oﬀers two convinc-
ing elements that may explain the change in the cross-country correlation.
These are (a) the presence of unmeasured country-speciﬁc factors and (b)
country heterogeneity in the magnitude of the negative time-series associa-
tion between fertility and female employment. Figure 2 (taken from K¨ ogel
2002) illustrates these points by choosing Italy and Sweden, two countries
representative for the development of TFR and FLP in the OECD sample.
In both cross sections (1965 and 1995) the FLP was higher in Sweden than
in Italy (supporting hypothesis (a)) and the increase in FLP is associated
with a much stronger decline of the TFR in Italy than in Sweden, which is
evidence for hypothesis (b).
Though these recent studies provide econometric evidence on why the
1The countries included are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
2Figure 1: Cross-country correlation between the total fertility rate and female
labor force participation rate, 1960-2000


































































































































3cross-country correlation changed and prove that the time series association
has not changed its sign, these studies do not provide us with a possible
list of factors that may actually explain the change in the cross-country
correlation coeﬃcient. The studies by Ahn and Mira (2002) and Benjamin
(2001) oﬀer some theories and data that may explain why the sign of the
cross-country correlation between TFR and FLP changed. Ahn and Mira
(2002) use an extension of the Butz and Ward (1979) framework to show the
importance of income eﬀects of female wages, inﬂexible working hours, the
possibility of purchasing childcare and unemployment. However, only data
for aggregate unemployment are actually presented, leaving the rest of the
discussion to rest on theoretical considerations. Benjamin (2001) presents
an extensive discussion on factors that may cause the reversal of the cross
country correlation coeﬃcient but then restricts her analysis to a pooled
cross section time series analysis of the TFR in which she only includes male
unemployment, GDP and country groups as explanatory variables in addition
to FLP.
The aim of our paper is to extend the set of labor market variables and to
also include demographic, educational and social policy indicators as plau-
sible factors that may explain the change in the sign of the cross-country
correlation coeﬃcient. This inclusion of demographic indicators is warranted
by the recent ﬁnding of Billari and Kohler (2002) that in European lowest
low fertility countries (including Eastern Europe), the cross-country correla-
tion between TFR and traditional determinants of fertility (such as the total
ﬁrst marriage rate and the total divorce rate) has changed its sign as well.
Similar to Ahn and Mira (and suggested by the ﬁndings in K¨ ogel 2002) we
start oﬀ by building country groups that are homogenous with respect to the
development of their FLP. While Ahn and Mira base their analysis on three
groups of countries that are assembled based on the average level of FLP
over the time period 1970-96 (cf. Appendix A) we apply a more dynamic
approach and assign countries into three groups based on average levels of
FLP over 10-year time periods (1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999).
We therefore allow countries to belong to diﬀerent country groups over these
four decades. Obviously, our grouping produces more homogenous groups of
countries by level of FLP during the 1960s and early 1970s (the time period
not considered in the study by Ahn and Mira). In Figure 3 we plot the
average level of FLP for the grouping suggested by Ahn and Mira (indicated
by the letters A&M) as well as for our alternative grouping (see Appendix A
for details on the country groupings).
4Figure 3: Average level of female labor participation rates in low, medium
and high participation countries
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Calculating the average TFR for each country group (Figure 4) (applying
our country grouping) conﬁrms the second hypothesis of K¨ ogel (2002): the
decline in TFR was much more pronounced in countries with lower FLP
levels.
In section four we shall assemble corresponding plots for a set of labor
market, educational and demographic variables and indicators of social pol-
icy. In particular we are interested in whether the change in the slope of
the decline in TFR across low, medium and high participation countries in
Figure 4 may be explained by a change in the slope of any of those other
factors.
We are aware that our approach is purely descriptive unlike the economet-
ric studies of Engelhardt et al. (2001), K¨ ogel (2002) and Benjamin (2001).
This is because several of our proposed indicators are only available for a
quinquennial period or less. However, as demonstrated by Ahn and Mira, a
fruitful task to start with could be good descriptive illustration of a hypoth-
esis that may have caused the cross-country correlation coeﬃcient to change
its sign.
In the following section we brieﬂy discuss two macro-economic approaches
5Figure 4: Average total fertility rates in low, medium and high participation
countries






















that aim to explain the mutual relationship between fertility and female
employment. In section three we shortly describe our variables and the choice
of countries. The selection of variables is driven by alternative economic
and demographic theories on the relation of fertility and female labor force
participation. Section four compiles the descriptive ﬁndings. We close with
a short discussion and an outlook for future research.
2 Theoretical Considerations
In economics, two contrasting schools have emerged to explain the relation-
ship between the changes in fertility and female labor force participation
over time: the New Home Economics model and the Easterlin model. Both
approaches attempt to put forward explanations for a negative relationship
between female employment and fertility. They diﬀer in their identiﬁcation
of the driving force, as indicated by the respective labels used to describe
them: the ‘value of time’ model and the ‘relative income’ model (Sander-
son 1976). The New Home Economics (e.g. the model by Willis 1973 and
its application by Butz and Ward 1979) focuses primarily on changes in the
6Table 1: Determinants of FLP and TFR
Association Association
with FLP with TFR
Labor market variables
Female wages (FW) +/– +/–
Male wages (MW) – +
Relative male income – +
Male-female wage ratio (MW-FW) + –
Female unemployment rate (FUR) – +
Male unemployment rate (MUR) –
Female hours (FH) +/–
Male labor participation rate (MLP) +
Proportion females in part time (PART) + +
Educational variables
Female tertiary gross enrolment ratio (GER) + –
Average years of school of females (YEARS) + –
Highest female education: 1st level (LEVEL1) + –
Highest female education: 2nd level (LEVEL2) + –
Highest female education: post 2nd level (LEVEL3) + –
Demographic variables
Total divorce rate (TDR) + –
Total female ﬁrst marriage rate (TFFMR) – +
Mean age at 1st birth (MAB1) –
Social Policies
Gross enrolment ratio of kids in pre-primary education (PREM) + +
Family allowances (FA1, FA2, FA3) +
value of a women’s time whereas Easterlin (1980, 1987) focuses on changes
in relative income due to the demographic cycle (the baby boom and bust).
The determinants of fertility and female employment mentioned by the two
economic schools and by the role incompatibility approach discussed below
are summarized in Table 1.
In the New Home Economics, fertility decisions are a function of individ-
ual preferences and the costs of children, given an income constraint (Becker
1991; Cigno 1991; Willis 1973). Since parents receive utility from increased
child ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’, the cost of children is endogenous in the models.
The costs of children include opportunity costs (the earning loss from reduced
labor supply), child-care costs (including the availability of child-care) and
time costs of raising and educating a child (including the domestic division of
labor). Oﬀsetting these costs to some extent are labor earnings adjustments
7by other household members as well as public and employer-provided welfare
beneﬁts and taxes. Surveys of empirical studies of the New Home Economics
fertility model are provided by Macunovich (1996) and Hotz et al. (1997).
The New Home Economics model stresses the role of female wages, rep-
resenting the opportunity cost of childbearing, as a determinant of fertility
(e.g. Willis 1973). Female wages are seen to have both (positive) income and
(negative) substitution/price eﬀects on fertility, with opposite eﬀects on fe-
male labor force participation. The income eﬀect refers to the fact that when
income increases, the demand for children increases as well, thus resulting
in an increase in fertility; the substitution eﬀect implies that when income
increases, the opportunity cost for having more children increases, thus lead-
ing to a dampening eﬀect on fertility. If all childrearing is done by women,
an increase in men’s wages will have a pure income eﬀect. The overall eﬀect
on fertility of a proportional increase in men’s and women’s wages is theo-
retically ambiguous. Empirically, the female wage rate (or other measures of
the opportunity costs of females) is more often negatively related to fertility
(Becker 1991; for an empirical overview see Hotz et al. 1997). Higher female
wages delay the timing of all conceptions and reduce total fertility (Heckman
and Walker 1990). Reduced wage diﬀerentials between men and women lead
women to substitute out of childrearing and into the labor market (Galor
and Weil 1996).
The potential earnings of women, and hence the price of raising children,
have increased as the educational level of women has risen. Given the divi-
sion of labor within the family, this increase in the earning capacity of women
has had an increasingly greater negative impact upon aggregate fertility (Er-
misch 1979). Therefore, we expect a positive association between the tertiary
gross enrolment ratio, the average years of schooling, and the highest educa-
tional level on employment and a negative eﬀect of these factors on fertility.
Furthermore, New Home Economics leads us to expect that women with a
high degree of human capital (education and training) will delay the birth of
their ﬁrst child (Hotz et al. 1997).
Unemployment is not explicitly considered in the models of the New Home
Economics. However, understood as a zero wage, unemployment induces a
strong income eﬀect for households in which the husband is employed, while
it should yield both income and substitution eﬀects if a participating wife
becomes unemployed (Ahn and Mira 2002). However, empirical evidence
shows mixed results: Andersson (2001) reports a stronger income eﬀect for
individual female unemployment in Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s, while
8Kravdal (2002) ﬁnds a slightly stronger substitution eﬀect for individual un-
employment for ﬁrst births in Norway in the period 1992-98, and a slightly
stronger income eﬀect for higher-order birth rates.
Butz and Ward (1979) used the New Home Economics model to deﬁne
a causal macro level relationship between fertility and female employment.
In this model, it is postulated that ﬂuctuations in fertility can be attributed
to a dominant substitution eﬀect of a rising female wage, and subsequently
varying levels of female labor force participation. Note, however, that par-
ticipation rates are considered to be exogenous to fertility rates, whereby the
participation rate depends on the joint distribution of male and female wages
(which are treated as exogenous) and other characteristics.
Easterlin’s ‘relative income’ hypothesis is, like the Butz’ and Wards’
model, a macro approach to fertility and female employment. The linkage
between higher birth rates and adverse economic and social eﬀects arises in
Easterlin’s approach from ‘crowding mechanisms’ operating within the fam-
ily, school, and labor market (Easterlin 1980, 1987). Easterlin emphasizes
the role of male incomes, relative to economic aspirations, as the driving force
behind fertility and female labor force participation. Economic aspirations
of young adults are determined by material conditions prevailing in their
parental homes during their teenage years. An increase in income relative
to economic aspirations shifts preferences in favor of childbearing and away
from female labor force activity and a decrease in relative income results
in increased female employment, delayed childbearing and reduced fertility.
However, in his ﬁrst theoretical considerations women were not considered
because Easterlin assumed that women are not on the labor market (Easterlin
1978).
In the full Easterlin model relative income is aﬀected by the size of the
young cohort relative to that of prime aged adults, both measured contempo-
raneously. An unusually large cohort of young adults faces competition from
their peers in education and employment opportunities, which leads to ad-
verse consequences on their earnings. At the same time the earnings of their
parents, who were attached to a smaller birth cohort, may have been unusu-
ally high, which would have contributed to the formation of high material
aspirations for the subsequent generation as they faced decisions concerning
fertility and labor market activity in their early adult years. Thus, the driv-
ing force behind both increased female labor force participation and reduced
fertility is the desire of a larger birth cohort to improve relative economic
status, with parental income as the measure of material aspirations. Empir-
9ical tests of the Easterlin model have been surveyed by Pampel and Peters
(1995) and Macunovich (1998). The literature suggests support for the rel-
ative income concept in fertility, but it seems to be less clear regarding the
sources of diﬀerences in material aspirations.
Because both the neoclassical model and the Easterlin story based on
wage structures poorly explain either common time trends or cross-national
variation in fertility and female employment, the emerging alternative hy-
pothesis in the demography literature is that societal level responses have
eased the incompatibility between childrearing and female employment (Brew-
ster and Rindfuss 2000; Rindfuss et al. 2000; Rindfuss and Brewster 1996;
Engelhardt et al. 2001). This hypothesis in turn nests within the broader
hypothesis that state policies aﬀect fertility rates by changing the costs of
children mentioned at the start of this section (see e.g., Gauthier 1996). This
alternative approach to the costs of children focuses less narrowly on the fe-
male wage as the measure of the ‘price’ of children. Instead it turns attention
to the ability of women to combine childbirth and work, and to the overall
costs, both to the household standard of living and to the woman’s career,
that arise from interruptions or reductions of labor supply in conjunction
with childbirth and child-rearing. This approach is qualitatively diﬀerent
from the neoclassical approach in that it focuses attention not on the wage
structure of a given society, but rather on the complex of social and eco-
nomic institutions. These institutions in turn determine how easily a woman
can combine work and family, that determine how costly it is to the family
when a women reduces her labor earnings, and that determines how large
the wage or career opportunity cost is based on the experienced labor market
reduction (cf. DiPrete et al. 2002).
The changes in the industrial and occupational structure have expanded
employment opportunities for women, especially for part-time employment
(O’Reilly and Fagan 1998). Increasing rates of part time employment, how-
ever, reduce the opportunity costs of children and, thus, increase fertility.
A measure of the availability of child-care is the gross enrolment ratio
of children in pre-primary education. Due to reduced opportunity costs this
ratio should have a positive eﬀect on the aggregated fertility rate as well as a
positive eﬀect on female employment. Family allowances reduce the income
constraint and, therefore, are expected to have a positive eﬀect on fertility.
Though not explicitly included theoretically by either the two schools of
economics or by the role incompatibility hypothesis, the eﬀects of other de-
mographic variables (e.g. the total ﬁrst marriage rate and the total divorce
10rate) on fertility and female employment can easily be derived by some ad hoc
considerations guided by a general (family) economic framework. Marriage
rates and divorce rates follow economic cycles. Positive economic develop-
ments coincide with increasing marriage and divorce rates (Cherlin 1992).
Easterlin (1980: 87) empirically observes, “...that low childbearing makes
for high divorce, and vice versa...”. A hypothesis for this phenomenon would
be that the perception of increasing divorce rates could be a “self-fulﬁlling
prophecy”. Women with doubts about a lifetime relation with their partners
may invest less in their relationships with the result of an increased divorce
risk due to the minor investments in marriage. The aggregate result of this
feedback eﬀect might be a negative relationship between divorce rates and
fertility rates and a positive relationship between divorce rates and female
labor force participation rates.
Associated with declining fertility rates, especially in Southern Europe,
is the emergence of a situation in which long-term partnership commitments
– symbolized through legal marriages – are declining (e.g. Billari and Kohler
2002). Withdrawing from a long-term investment in marriage may also co-
incide with a withdrawal from fertility. Generally it is assumed that there
is a positive relationship between marriage rates and fertility rates and a
negative relationship between marriage rates and participation rates.
3 Data and Variables
To describe the changing correlation between fertility and female employ-
ment, we use a set of labor market variables, educational variables, demo-
graphic variables and indicators of social policies, as discussed below. The
data used in the empirical analysis are compiled from a number of publicly
available sources to construct a full series of single-year ﬁgures from 1960 to
2000. For an overview of data and sources see Table 2. The countries included
are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
and the United States. The selection of countries is based on the availability
of data for our indicators.
Our two central variables are TFR and FLP. The TFR is a period fer-
tility rate that takes into consideration the age structure of a population.
It is the hypothetical number of children a women would have if she experi-
11Table 2: Variables and Sources
Variables Sources
Main variables
Total fertility rate (TFR) United Nations Demographic Yearbook,
New Cronos (Eurostat Database),
German Federal Statistical Oﬃce
Female labor participation rate (FLP) Comparative Welfare Data Set(b),
OECD Labor Force Statistics
Labor market variables
Female wages (FW) ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics,
Male wages (MW) Comparative Family Beneﬁts Database(a)
Male-female wage ratio (MW-FW) = Female Wages / Male Wages
Female unemployment rate (FUR) Comparative Welfare Data Set(b),
Male unemployment rate (MUR) OECD Labor Force Statistics
Female hours (FH) ILO Yearbook of Labor Statistics
Male labor participation rate (MLP) Comparative Welfare Data Set(b),
OECD Labor Force Statistics
Proportion females in part time (PART) OECD Labor Force Statistics
Educational variables
Female tertiary gross enrolment ratio (GER) UNESCO(c)
Average years of school of females (YEARS) Barro and Lee (2001),
de la Fuente and Dom´ enech (2002)(d)
Highest female education: 1st level (LEVEL1) Barro and Lee (2001),
de la Fuente and Dom´ enech (2002)(d)
Highest female education: 2nd level (LEVEL2)Barro and Lee (2001),
de la Fuente and Dom´ enech (2002)(d)
Highest female education: post 2nd level Barro and Lee (2001),
(LEVEL3) de la Fuente and Dom´ enech (2002)(d)
Demographic variables
Total divorce rate (TDR) Council of Europe (2001)
Total female ﬁrst marriage rate (TFFMR) Council of Europe (2001)
Mean age at 1st birth (MAB1) New Cronos CD 2001,
Council of Europe (2001)
Social Policies
Gross enrolment ratio of kids in pre- Comparative Family Beneﬁts Database(a)
primary education (PREM)
Family allowances for 1st child (FA1) Comparative Family Beneﬁts Database(a)
Family allowances for 2nd child (FA2) Comparative Family Beneﬁts Database(a)
Family allowances for 3rd child (FA3) Comparative Family Beneﬁts Database(a)




12enced the age-speciﬁc fertility rates of a given time period in her reproductive
lifetime. The TFR is compiled from diﬀerent sources: the United Nations De-
mographic Yearbook, the New Cronos Eurostat Database, and the German
Federal Statistical Oﬃce.
The FLP is the number of women working part- or full-time or actively
seeking employment at ages 15-64 divided by the total female population aged
15-64. Ideally, one would want the FLP for women of childbearing years only,
but age-speciﬁc single-year data was not available for all countries. The FLP
data from 1960 to 1994 for most of our countries is available online through
the Comparative Welfare Data Set, assembled by Huber et al. (1997). For
Greece and Spain as well as for the other countries after 1994, we used various
issues of the OECD Labor Force Statistics.2 For West Germany we applied
data from the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce based on the Micro census
after 1989.
Our labor market indicators include male labor force participation rates,
female wages, male wages, the male-female wage gap, the female and male
unemployment rate, female and male working hours, and the share of females
in part time employment. Male labor force participation rates (MLP) are de-
ﬁned according to the FLP as described above. The data on hourly female
wages (FW), hourly male wages (MW), and weekly female working hours
(FH) in non-agricultural activities is published in the “Yearbook of Labour
Statistics” by the International Labor Oﬃce (ILO).3 In a limited number
of countries (Canada, Italy, and the United States), wages were not avail-
able by sex and were estimated by Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) using other
national sources. Gauthier provided the data with a preliminary version of
the Comparative Family Beneﬁts Database 1970-2000. Because wages from
both sources are measured in the respective national currencies we divided
2Information is collected by the OECD through responses to annual questionnaires
sent to each country and through other national and international sources and reports.
Because of possible diﬀerences in how a country deﬁnes “employment”, these numbers
are not strictly comparable across countries. Since we compare changes in employment
rates over time rather than employment rates across countries, this is not expected to be
a problem (Benjamin 2001).
3The OECD wage and hours data are mostly obtained from payroll data supplied by
a sample of establishments. In a few cases, household sample surveys or social insurance
statistics provide the data on hours worked. The data from these various sources are not
fully comparable in view of diﬀerences in scope, coverage and methods of data collection.
However, as in the case of employment rates, this is not expected to be a problem, as we
are not comparing wages across countries but rather changes over time.
13the national wages by the purchasing power parity (PPP) indexes in US $
(provided by the OCED National Accounts) that estimate the diﬀerences in
price levels between countries. As a measure of the gender wage gap we use
the ratio of female to male wages. The male and female unemployment rate
(MUR, FUR) is deﬁned as the number of persons aged 15 to 64 actively seek-
ing employment divided by the respective numbers of persons in the labor
force. Data on FUR and MUR for selected countries till 1994 come from the
Comparative Welfare Dataset. For the remaining countries and years data
come from the OECD Labor Force Statistics. The latter was also our data
source for the number of females in part time employment as a share of the
female employment (PART).
As educational variables we employ the tertiary gross enrolment ratio
(GER), the average years of schooling of females over age 25 (YEARS) and
the highest educational level completed by females over age 25 (LEVEL1,
LEVEL2, LEVEL3). The GER is deﬁned by the UNESCO as the “total
enrolment in a speciﬁc level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a
percentage of the oﬃcial school age population corresponding to the same
level of education on a given school year.” The data on GER is published on-
line by the UNESCO. The highest educational level is deﬁned as the fraction
of the population aged 25 and over that has completed primary schooling
(LEVEL1), lower and upper secondary schooling (LEVEL2) and two levels
of higher education (LEVEL3). The estimated data on schooling and highest
educational level is available online and described by Barro and Lee (2001)
and de la Fuente and Dom´ enech (2002). Note that data is only available in
ﬁve years intervals.
As demographic indicators we include the total divorce rate (TDR), the
total female ﬁrst marriage rate (TFFMR), and the mean age at ﬁrst birth
(MAB1) in our analyses. The TFFMR gives the proportion of females who
would ever marry for the ﬁrst time in a hypothetical cohort of persons who at
each age x experienced the relevant age speciﬁc ﬁrst marriage rates applying
in a particular year. Similarly the TDR is the proportion of divorced couples
in a hypothetical cohort who at each age x experienced the relevant age
speciﬁc divorce rate applying in a particular year. The series are obtained
from the Council of Europe (2001). The data for MAB1 is from the New
Cronos CD 2001.
Finally, as indicators for national social policies we take the gross en-
rolment ratio in pre-primary education (PREM) and the monthly family
allowances for the ﬁrst, second and third child in national currency (FA1,
14Figure 5: Average male labor participation rates in low, medium and high
participation countries

















FA2, FA3). To compare the amount of allowances relative to male wages,
FA1, FA2, and FA3 are divided by estimated monthly male wages. Since for
most countries male wages were only available per hour, and weekly working
hours were missing for most years and countries, we assumed an average of
forty working hours per week and country. The estimation was then obtained
by multiplying the hourly male wages by forty times four. 4 All data on so-
cial policy indicators are taken from the preliminary Comparative Family
Beneﬁts Database 1970-2000 personally provided to us by A. Gauthier.
4 Empirical Evidence
We start our investigation by considering the change in the male economic
position across time and space. While FLP has increased across time and
space MLP shows a clear downward trend (Figure 5)5 over the last three
4Sensitivity analysis yields that our results are robust to the assumption of constant
working hours across time and countries.
5Since data on MLP are lacking for several countries prior to 1970 and after 1994 we
present country averages only for 1970-1994. During this time period we are still missing
15Figure 6: Average male unemployment rates in low, medium and high par-
ticipation countries


















decades, which was particularly severe for the group of low FLP countries
from 1982 to 1986, the time during which the cross-country relation between
TFR and FLP changed its sign as well. In addition, the MUR in those
countries with already low FLP and MLP rates increased the most during
the time period 1980-1984 (Figure 6). 6 These ﬁgures clearly evidence the
fact that the male economic status became more unstable over time for all
countries in our sample. This negative development was most pronounced
for the group of countries with low FLP where the economic status of men
might be of greater importance for fertility decisions and the negative income
eﬀect of a decline in MLP and an increase in MUR is most pronounced.
Not only was the male economic status the lowest in those countries with
the lowest FLP, but the female unemployment rate was also the highest for
those countries (Figure 7).7 The increase in the FUR in the low FLP countries
data for GRE, NET, POR and SPA. However the overall trend of MLP is independent of
those missing values.
6Since data on MUR are lacking for several countries prior to 1974 we present country
averages only for 1975-1999.
7Since data on FUR are lacking for several countries prior to 1974 we present country
16Figure 7: Average female unemployment rates in low, medium and high
participation countries





















in the time period (1980-1985) coincides with the sharp decline in TFR in
those countries. While the MUR and MLP show some convergence between
low and high FLP countries or at least some stabilization during the 90s the
FUR stays exceptionally high for those countries where FLP is the lowest
and TFR decreased the most. It seems that the income eﬀect dominated
for those countries where FUR was highest and leads to the steep reduction
in TFR. The fact that TFR declined the most in those countries with low
FLP and high FUR may be further explained by the fact that those are
also the countries where the economic status of males was the worst thereby
reinforcing the negative income eﬀect that resulted from the high level of
FUR.
With the increase of FLP the gender wage gap declined over time (Fig-
ure 8). However, in the low FLP countries the gender wage gap stabilized
between the early 80s and the early 90s, the time period during which TFR
declined strongly in those countries. Note that the ratio of female to male
wages was lowest in the medium FLP countries. Hence, while the stagnating
gender wage gap may have contributed to worsening females’ role in the la-
averages only for 1975-1999.
17Figure 8: Gender wage-gap in low, medium and high participation countries


















bor market in low FLP countries the gender wage gap was not exceptionally
big in those countries. A comparison of the slope in the increase of male and
female wages (Figure 9 and 10) shows that wages increased less steeply in
low FLP countries as compared to high FLP countries.
Besides the labor market status of female and male partners, which deter-
mine the economic/income constraints on fertility, the ﬂexibility in working
hours may impinge on the compatibility of employment and childrearing.
The possibility of part time work does not seem to be exceptionally low for
our group of countries with low FLP (or conversely high in high FLP coun-
tries) (Table 3). 8 For instance, the Netherlands is among the countries with
low FLP during the 80s and part of the 90s but it has the highest share of
part time employment for women in our sample of countries (most of the
increase in FLP in the Netherlands is due to the increase in part time em-
ployment for women (Henkens, Grift and Siegers 2002)). On the contrary,
FLP is among the highest in Finland but the share of women in part time
8Since data on part time employment are lacking for several time periods and countries
we present the part time employment for each country and selected time points instead
of presenting country averages for our three country groups. We use the the grouping
suggested by Ahn and Mira as in Figure 3.
18Figure 9: Male wages in low, medium and high participation countries



















Figure 10: Female wages in low, medium and high participation countries



















19Table 3: Proportion of females employed part time in low, medium and high
participation countries
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
low participation BEL 26.2 31.4 32.1
GRE 10.8 11.5 13.2
LUX 18.5 19.1 28.4 28.9
IRE 17.8 20.5 26.6 32.2
ITA 16 18.2 21.1 23.4
NET 45.5 52.5 54.7 57.2
SPA 11.5 15.9 16.5
medium participation AUL 34.9 36.9 38.5 40.2 40.7
AUS 21.6 24.4
FRA 20.3 21.7 24.3 24.3
FRG 25.4 29.8 29.1 33.9
JPN 28.6 30 33.4 34.9 39.4
POR 11.8 14.5 14.7
high participation CAN 25.9 28.2 26.8 28.2 27.3
DEN 32.8 28.6 24.2
FIN 10.7 12.3 10.6 11.5 13.9
NOR 39.8 37.5 33.6
SWE 24.5 24.1 21.4
SWZ 44.9 44.7
UKM 41.1 39.5 40.7 40.8
USA 21.9 21.5 20 20.3 18.2
employment is the lowest. One should however keep in mind that comparing
part time employment across countries might be ﬂawed since its deﬁnition
will vary across countries (OECD Labor Force Statistics 1980-2000). Most
important for our argument is that the data underlying Table 3 do not show
any exceptional slope in the change of part time employment for low FLP
countries and may therefore not explain the exceptional drop in TFR in those
countries during the 80s.
Female hours worked is a further, and possibly less biased measure (since
its deﬁnition is more clear-cut) that may explain the incompatibility between
FLP and fertility. Table 4 gives some weak evidence that low FLP countries
are less ﬂexible in working hours for females.9 E.g. while the average FH is
9Similar to Table 3 data on female hours are lacking for several time periods and
countries and we present female hours for each country and selected time points instead of
20Table 4: Female working hours per week in low, medium and high participa-
tion countries
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
low participation NET 40.1 39.6 39.2 39
GRE 39.1 38.3 40.5 40 41
IRE 36.9 37.6 37.9 36.3
ITA 38.2 37.9
LUX 38.4 39.4 38.4
SPA 36.2 34.5 34.9 34.7 34
medium participation AUL 33.8 32.7 33.2 32.9 33
AUS 32.8 33.2
FRG 40 39.5 38.4 37.4
JPN 38.4 38.4 34.7 34.5
POR 38.7 39.4
high participation FIN 36.2 36.2
NOR 31.7 31.6 31.3 31.8 32.2
SWE 32.8 33.5 34.5
UKM 37.3 40 40.5 39.3 38.9
around 40 for Greece, Swedish women work on average 7 hours less. How
much the inﬂexibility in working hours has deterred women from entering
the labor force in our group of low FLP countries cannot be determined by
our aggregate descriptive illustrations. We may only conclude that in those
countries with low FLP, the compatibility between labor force participation
and childbearing is more diﬃcult and may therefore have contributed to
further depressing the TFR.
A further explanation of why fertility may have declined more rapidly
in low FLP countries could be that educational variables have evolved dif-
ferently in those countries for females. Figure 11 and 12 clearly refute such
a hypothesis. Neither GER nor the average number of years of school for
females has evolved diﬀerently in low FLP countries as compared to high and
medium FLP countries. For all three country groups we observe an increas-
ing trend for both variables over time with a higher level of female education
in high FLP countries. We may only argue that as female education rises
(for countries with both low and high FLP) the implication of high FUR
and MUR and low MLP may change as well. For instance, the opportunity
presenting country averages for our three country groups. We use the grouping suggested
by Ahn and Mira as in Figure 3.
21Figure 11: Tertiary gross enrolment ratio of females in low, medium and high
participation countries




















cost of being out of the labor force may increase with the number of years
spent in education and an increase in FUR may therefore be more severely
perceived and imply a more pronounced negative impact on fertility.
It is interesting to verify whether the decline in fertility has been accompa-
nied by an equally pronounced decline in any of the proximate determinants
of fertility behavior. While total female ﬁrst marriage rates (TFFMR) were
stable for low FLP countries and declining for high and medium FLP coun-
tries up to the early 1970s, TFFMR have declined thereafter for all three
country groups (Figure 13). We observe a convergence of TFFMR among
the three country groups since the early 80s. From a time series point of view
we may argue that marriage is still a valid proximate determinant of fertility
behavior since the overall decline in TFR was accompanied by a decline in
TFFMR. However, from a cross sectional view the marriage rate is no longer
positively correlated to fertility, as is also shown in Billari and Kohler for
European lowest low fertility countries (2002) and in Figure 13. TFFMR
and TFR may still be closely interdependent in countries where long-term
commitment to partnership is still the norm. In these countries (e.g. Italy)
any decrease in TFFMR (caused for instance by the declining economic sta-
22Figure 12: Average years of schooling of females in low, medium and high
participation countries




















tus of men and women) may therefore be linked to the pronounced decrease
in TFR.
A further proximate determinant of fertility behavior may be the total
divorce rate. Figure 14 rejects the hypothesis that an exceptionally high
divorce rate among low FLP countries may be a driving factor for the pro-
nounced decrease in the fertility in those countries. TDR is lowest for low
FLP countries over the whole time period considered.
Besides partnership formation and dissolution the age at ﬁrst birth be-
longs to the group of proximate determinants of fertility behavior. Age at
ﬁrst birth is of particular interest with respect to the postponement of child-
bearing, which has been cited as one of the systematic patterns of lowest
low fertility (cf. Billari and Kohler 2002). Figure 15 indicates that the drop
in fertility in low FLP countries may be related to their more pronounced
increase in MAB1. 10 While MAB1 was lowest among low FLP countries
during the 70s and started to increase with a lag of about 5 years compared
to the high FLP countries, MAB1 is now highest among low FLP countries.
10We do not have data on MAB1 for AUL, CAN, JPN, most of the time periods in
LUX, nor on early time periods for Norway and Spain.
23Figure 13: Total female ﬁrst marriage rate in low, medium and high partici-
pation countries




















Figure 14: Total divorce rate in low, medium and high participation countries






















24Figure 15: Mean age at ﬁrst birth in low, medium and high participation
countries



















Though a delay in childbearing does not necessarily correlate with a low TFR
(e.g. the Netherlands have one of the highest MAB1 but their TFR is among
the highest while for Greece MAB1 is among the lowest while TFR in Greece
has dropped markedly in the 80s and 90s), an increase in MAB1 has lowered
the progression probability after the ﬁrst child at least for part of the low
FLP countries included in our study (cf. Billari and Kohler 2002).
From the previous discussion we may conclude that TFFMR, TDR and
MAB1 may still be proximate determinants of fertility behavior from a time
series point of view (we observe a decline in TFR that goes hand in hand
with a decrease in TFFMR and an increase in TDR and MAB1). However,
the cross-country relationship between partnership formation and dissolution
and fertility as well as between the age at ﬁrst childbearing and fertility has
become indeterminate during the late 90s (cf. Billari and Kohler 2002).
Nevertheless, our illustrations indicate that for low FLP countries the drop
in TFFMR and the increase in MAB1 was more pronounced during the time
period when TFR dropped the most. We regard these ﬁndings as evidence
that the less fortunate economic conditions in those countries may have had
a profound impact on these proximate determinants of fertility and therefore
25reinforced the direct negative impact of economic conditions on fertility.
We conclude our descriptive representations with the consideration of so-
cial policy variables. Figure 16 plots the gross enrolment ratio of children in
pre-primary education (PREM).11 Surprisingly, PREM was highest among
low FLP countries and lowest for high FLP countries since the late 70s. We
are cautious to interpret these ﬁndings as evidence for the higher compatibil-
ity of child rearing and labor force participation in low FLP countries since a
well established literature (on the micro as well as macro level) exists, show-
ing that family policies and social norms are lacking in many of the countries
where we observe the lowest levels of fertility in the 80s and 90s (Gornick et
al. 1997). More likely these results may be evidence for the fact that a higher
gross enrolment ratio of children in pre-primary education is not contributing
signiﬁcantly to lowering child-care costs and time costs of raising and edu-
cating a child. One explanation may be that in those countries where PREM
is low there are other childcare systems available for children at pre-primary
education age. As previous studies have shown, the availability of childcare
at younger ages may have a higher variance across countries (OECD 2001).
Further indicators that may reduce the incompatibility of childrearing
and labor force participation by reducing the opportunity costs of children
are family allowances. We calculate the share of FA as a percentage of the
monthly male wage income to compare the importance of FA across countries
and present only family allowance for ﬁrst children (FA1) where diﬀerences
across countries are most pronounced. Figure 17 indicates that FA1 are low-
est for low FLP countries and, even more importantly, FA1 declined during
the mid 80s for low FLP countries, the time period when TFR dropped the
most in those countries.12 During the early 90s, FA1 increased considerably
in high FLP countries while the increase was more moderate in low FLP coun-
tries (apart from the increase at the beginning of the 90s which is mainly
due to the increase in FA1 in Spain at this time). We may conclude that the
higher share of FA1 in high FLP countries may have had a positive impact
on fertility by reducing the opportunity costs of childbearing while the lower
level of FA1 in low FLP countries may have further depressed fertility since
opportunity costs are higher.
11We are missing data for PREM for the time period before 1970. Data are also incom-
plete for several countries. However, the general picture in Figure 16 is not perturbed by
these omissions.
12Data on FA1 are missing for several time periods and for the USA and FRA. The high
levels of FA1 for the medium FLP countries is mainly driven by the high FA1 in Austria.
26Figure 16: Gross enrolment ratio in pre-primary education in low, medium
and high participation countries























Figure 17: Share of family allowances for ﬁrst child on the monthly male
wage income in low, medium and high participation countries






















According to a recent piece of literature, unmeasured country-speciﬁc factors
as well as country-heterogeneity in the magnitude of the negative time-series
association accounts for the change in the cross-country correlation between
the total fertility rate and the female labor market participation rate (K¨ ogel
2002). In this study we have tried to identify the factors that may explain
country heterogeneity in the negative association between fertility and female
employment.
Our methodological approach is purely descriptive due to severe data re-
strictions of the available macro data. To account for country-heterogeneity
we start oﬀ by building country groups that are homogeneous with respect
to the development of their female participation rates. This grouping is done
in a dynamic way that accounts for country-speciﬁc heterogeneity in the in-
crease in female employment. Diﬀerent slopes for various indicators over
time help us to understand the changing mediating relationship between
these factors and the fertility/employment nexus. The methodological ap-
proach is interpretative, though mainly guided by family economic and role
incompatibility considerations. Due to data limitations we were not able to
explicitly test Easterlin’s relative income hypothesis.
The family economic approach focuses primarily on changes in the value
of women’s time as the driving force between changes in fertility and female
employment. Since women’s time is aﬀected by numerous factors with a cer-
tain variety in time and space, this approach seems to be a reasonable start-
ing point for our considerations. The empirical analyses are supplemented
by implications of the role incompatibility approach according to which soci-
etal level responses have eased the incompatibility between childrearing and
female employment. This alternative approach focuses less narrowly on the
female wage as a measure of the price of women’s time, and instead turns
attention to the ability of women to combine childbirth and work.
In our empirical analysis, we consider labor market variables, educational
variables and demographic variables as well as indicators of social policy.
Regarding the theoretically suggested labor market indicators, our results
indicate that male labor force participation and male unemployment rates
became more unstable over time and that this development was most pro-
nounced in low female employment countries. The increase of female unem-
ployment in the beginning of the 80s in low participation countries coincides
with the sharp decline in fertility. Female and male wages increased over
28time for all countries included in our study with a slightly lesser slope in
low FLP countries as compared to high FLP countries. However in low par-
ticipation countries the female to male wage ratio stagnated during the 80s
as compared to the continuous improvement in high participation countries.
Surprisingly, the share of part time employment for women does not correlate
with the participation rate and the only slight increase in most countries may
not explain the drop in fertility. However, there seems to be less ﬂexibility
in working hours in low than in high participation countries.
Considering education, neither the tertiary gross enrolment ratio nor the
average years of schooling of females has evolved diﬀerently in countries with
low female labor force participation. We may only assert that as female
education has risen the implication of opportunity costs (e.g., due to female
and male unemployment) may have changed as well.
In all countries included in our study the decline in fertility was accompa-
nied by a general decline in female ﬁrst marriage rates and an increase in total
divorce rates. However, we do not observe any diﬀerence in the change of
these demographic variables between countries of low and high female labor
force participation. We ﬁnd evidence that the drop in fertility in countries
with low female labor force participation is related to the postponement of a
ﬁrst child.
Concerning our indicators for social policy we do not ﬁnd support that
an increase in the gross enrolment ratio of kids in pre-primary education
accounts for the change in cross-country correlation. However, we ﬁnd some
evidence that the share of family allowances for the ﬁrst child as a percentage
of the monthly male wage income are lowest for countries with low female
labor force participation, and they have declined during the time period when
fertility dropped most in those countries.
From a family’s economic point of view, our results suggest that the
negative income eﬀect of a decline in male labor participation rates and an
increase in male unemployment rates is most pronounced in the group of
countries with low FLP. Furthermore, it seems that the income eﬀect domi-
nated for those countries where the female unemployment rate was highest.
The negative income eﬀect resulting from a high level of female unemploy-
ment in those countries with low FLP was most likely reinforced by the worse
economic status of males. The higher share of family allowances in high fe-
male participation countries may have had a positive impact on fertility by
reducing the opportunity costs of childbearing and rearing. In sum, male
labor participation, male and female unemployment and the share of family
29allowances for the ﬁrst child may be responsible for the country heterogeneity
in the magnitude of the negative time-series association between fertility and
female employment.
The changing correlation between TFR and FLP can also be understood
from the emerging alternative role incompatibility hypothesis in the demo-
graphic literature. We have some weak evidence that low FLP countries are
less ﬂexible in working hours for females. Here, the compatibility between
labor force participation and childbearing is more diﬃcult and may therefore
have contributed to further depressing the TFR. The change in the gross en-
rolment ratio of children in pre-primary education, however, does not seem
to reduce the work-children incompatibility in low participation countries.
This result suggests that child-care costs and the time costs of raising and
educating a child do not seem to be considerably lowered by the existing
forms of pre-primary education in low employment countries. However, our
measures of child care (PREM) and direct payments for children (FA1) do
not completely capture the true story. Recently, Apps and Rees (2001: 15)
conclude from a formal analysis that “this result tells us that in two other-
wise identical economies, the one which places more weight on subsidising
bought-in child care and less on direct child payment will have both higher
fertility and higher female labor supply.”
Our results also indicate that on a cross-country level, demographic in-
dicators such as the TFFMR or the TDR are no longer valid proximate
determinants of fertility. In line with the argument given by Billari and
Kohler (2002), long term partnership commitments in many of the low FLP
countries included in our study may have been an obstacle rather than a
fortune for fertility. As TFFMR and TDR decreased and respectively in-
creased in low FLP countries, fertility levels dropped faster as compared to
high FLP countries where long term commitments of partnerships and child-
bearing are less connected (Prskawetz et al. 2002). One may argue that
the decline in TFFMR and the increase in TDR in high FLP countries was
independent of the economic status of male and females and more a sign of
liberal partnerships. In low FLP countries, the drop in TFFMR and TDR
was closely connected to the worsening economic status of males and most
likely not a sign of more liberal partnerships. Moreover, as discussed in Bet-
tio and Villa (1998) a ‘cohesive family has encouraged very low fertility’ in
the Mediterranean low FLP countries.
The descriptive evidence on the cross-national patterns do not, of course,
prove that the change in the cross-country correlation between fertility and
30female employment is due to country-speciﬁc changes in income structures
and societal level circumstances in combining fertility and female employ-
ment. More evidence would be needed in order to build a strong case for such
a relationship. However, many Asian countries with a traditional conserva-
tive family pattern and increasing female employment rates could provide a
test for such a relationship. According to our descriptive ﬁndings for OECD
countries we would expect a decrease in fertility in the near future.
A clear message of our aggregate descriptive representations is that female
labor force participation represents only one dimension in a set of indicators
that determines cross-country diﬀerences in the economics of the family. To
understand cross-country diﬀerentials in fertility it is necessary to consider a
broader spectrum of confounding indicators such as those related to male and
female economic status, institutional arrangements and the role of proximate
determinants of fertility across countries.
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35Appendix A
Ahn and Mira (2002)
Grouping of countries by FLP over the time period 1970-1996:










Grouping of countries by FLP over the time periods 1960-1969, 1970-1979,
1980-1989, 1990-1999. In addition to Ahn and Mira (2002) we also include
Luxembourg while we exclude New Zealand due to diﬀerent data sources on
which the FLP series is based before 1985 and after 1985.
1960-1969:







Note: we exclude Norway from this time period since the FLP has been obtained from
two diﬀerent data sources before and after 1970. Data for Greece, Spain and Portugal are
not available for this time period.
361970-1979:










Note: Data for Portugal are not available for this period.
1980-1989:
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